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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.

Kenya adopted a new constitution in August 2010. This marked a key turning point in the
country’s political life. Kenya had failed to produce a new constitution in spite of efforts
over a long period to develop one. Political divisions deepened in the process,
culminating in the post-2007 election violence. The post-election violence exposed deepseated weaknesses in Kenya’s political system and institutions of the state generally. The
violence ended after the two parties to the dispute, the Government/Party of National
Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), signed the Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement (referred to here as the National
Accord), under the mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African
Personalities, led by Mr Kofi Annan.

2.

The dialogue and reconciliation process identified constitutional and institutional
reforms as critical for the achievement of sustainable peace and stability. The new
constitution is, thus, an important achievement of the KNDR process. It marks a fresh
start for Kenya.

3.

This review report covers the period between April and June 2011. It examines the
progress in implementing reforms during this transition period. It has focussed on the
key themes under the KNDR agreement. Previous reports are found at
www.dialoguekenya.org
Findings

4.

Data collected between 2008 and2010 period reveal that the social-political and
economic situation did improve after the signing of the National Accord and got better.
By the end of 2010, many people stated that life was better compared to 2008 and they
felt safer. By June 2011, however, people cite the rising cost of living and inflation in
general as the main challenges facing the country. Only half of the respondents feel safer.
Many people feel life is getting worse as compared to one year ago. The difficult socioeconomic situation requires to be addressed urgently because its negative social
consequences could exacerbate political difficulties and destabilise the framework for
reforms and the society in general.

The ICC and the fight against impunity
5.

The ICC intervention in the Kenya situation has increasingly become a driver of the
politics around the 2012 elections. It is seeking to re-establish accountability in Kenya’s
political culture and is, therefore, causing anxiety among political elites. It has
occasioned the formation and fragmentation of ethnic coalitions. Nonetheless, many
Kenyans still believe that prosecution of perpetrators of violence will prevent a
recurrence of violence. They are disillusioned by the lack of progress in arresting lower
and middle level perpetrators and holding senior and influential people to account.

6.

Politicians are widely viewed as sponsors of illegal armed groups that took part in the
violence, and which transformed into extortion gangs. Up to 42 per cent of respondents
in the survey think these illegal groups will emerge and play a political role before 2012.
Failure to prosecute political and civil crimes has eroded public confidence in the
government’s ability and willingness to fight impunity. It has slowed the momentum of
citizen advocacy for prosecution or other forms of accountability.

7.

National baseline survey data show that more than 50 per cent of respondents are
optimistic that there will be no violence in 2012. Nonetheless, lethargy in the fight
against impunity for political violence is causing public disillusionment. Deterrence

v

measures promised under the framework of the National Accord have not been effected.
Given past experience with violence during election years, failure to take concrete steps
to break the cycle of impunity is increasing public anxiety as the 2012 elections approach.
The challenge of resettling IDPs
8.

The government has made efforts to find durable solutions to IDPs: food, shelter,
counselling, money, land and peace efforts. However, IDPs are still in camps. The
challenges that have encumbered the resettlement programme stem from failure to carry
out a comprehensive registration and profiling of IDPs from the onset. Such a profiling
exercise would have identified the different categories of IDPs and appropriate solutions
for each.

9.

Allocating land to landless IDPs has attracted land-hungry persons into camps seeking to
benefit from the exercise. Efforts to allocate land have also triggered local discourses of
favouritism and exclusion, as well as local rejection of IDPs. This suggests that local level
grievances, particularly around land, are yet to be resolved. It is important to emphasise
that the presence of IDPs in camps, three years after the signing of the National Accord,
indicates that communities have not fully reconciled and that reforms have been
insufficient in this regard. As the next General Election approaches, greater effort needs
to be put into establishing the identity and origin of those in camps and why they are
unable to return, in order to provide appropriate durable solutions.
Implementation of the new constitution

10.

The promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010 marked a new beginning in
Kenya. The country has had a tortuous and protracted two-decade struggle for
comprehensive constitutional reforms. A new constitution is an important milestone in
Kenya’s history. It clearly marks a new beginning and a transition from the older order to
the new one. There is progress in making some of the laws prioritised under Schedule
Five. However, there are many laws to be finalised by 27 August 2011, the deadline
imposed by the constitution. Parliament will have to speed up the legislative process to
meet this deadline. Divisions in Parliament along party and other cleavages, however,
will have to be resolved for Parliament to effectively meet this challenge.

11.

A conservative political culture and the old order threaten implementation of the new
constitution. Lack of bi-partisan leadership, internal conflicts in the coalition and in
Parliament are slowing the pace of implementing the constitution. Further, civic
education providers have not been active yet awareness on the new constitution is critical
for building citizens knowledge to create demand for reforms. However, the public is
supportive of the new achievements, such as the public participation in the appointment
of key state officers.

12.

The constitution is one major achievement thus far. It is opening a new window for
reforms and offering a fresh start. It has set new standards in the appointment of public
officers. But there has been limited progress in some areas such as reforming the police,
national cohesion and reconciliation, and the fight against impunity in general. As the
country approaches the next elections, there is need to fast-track police reforms and
enactment of electoral laws in order to make adequate preparations for a clean and
peaceful poll.
Long-term issues and solutions

13.

Another General Election is fast approaching when progress in institutional reforms such
as the police has been slow. Communities have not fully reconciled and IDPs are in

vi

camps. Nonetheless, the new constitution also spells out the reform measures to be
undertaken to improve the police. Change of attitude and behaviour, and adherence to
modern democratic norms is an imperative for the police as the country moves towards
another election. Thus, vetting of the police must be opened to the public in line with the
new standards. This will improve public confidence in the police and begin creating a
culture of transparency.
14.

There is progress in reforming the Judiciary. The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief
Justice are in office through a process that had public participation at its core. Nominees
for other Judges of the Supreme Court were also recruited through a transparent process;
a new standard entrenched by the constitution. There is also increased vigilance in the
recruitment process. Public litigation efforts have increased in this respect.

Conclusion
15.
The report has emphasised that the Agenda 4 reforms under the KNDR agreement were
aimed at securing sustainable peace by addressing all the fault lines from which the postelection violence evolved. The discussion has also noted that the new constitution firmly
anchors all the Agenda 4 reforms. The spirit of constitutionalism – based on values and
principles espoused by the new constitution – is required to move the country forward.
The new constitution is not an end in it itself; it is a means for achieving the goal of
‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya’.
16.

Not all the fault-lines around which post-2007 elections occurred have been bridged.
Political competition is still organised around ethnic coalitions and alliances. The high
cost of living is fuelling new grievances, which could converge with other political
dynamics to destabilise the framework for reforms as the country moves towards another
election. Critical institutions, laws and processes for the next elections should be put in
place early enough to enable adequate preparations. There is need to fast-track police
reforms and enact electoral laws to ensure a clean and peaceful election. Importantly, the
date for the next General Election must be clarified as soon as possible in order to
prepare everyone and to put in place in good time the requisite institutional and
logistical measures.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

17.

On 27 August 2010, Kenya turned a new page by promulgating its constitution. This is an
important development in the country’s political history. Kenya had failed to produce a
new constitution in spite of efforts over a long period to develop one. This failure to
undertake comprehensive reforms deepened socio-political divisions, which found
expression in the violence that followed the dispute over the 2007 presidential election.
The violence exposed structural weaknesses in Kenya’s political system and institutions
of the state. The violence ended after the two parties to the dispute, the
Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM), signed the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement,
through the mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African
Personalities, led by Mr Kofi Annan.

18.

The parties committed to undertake far reaching reforms to prevent a recurrence of
violence. They committed to the goal of ‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in
Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human rights’. They committed to tackle
four main issues expressed as Agenda Items 1-4.2

19.

The dialogue and reconciliation process identified, under Agenda Item 4, constitutional
and institutional transformation crucial to sustainable peace and stability and as a
foundation for comprehensive reforms. The new constitution is thus an important
achievement of the KNDR process. It marks a fresh start for Kenya because it is a
transition from the older order to a new one.

20.

This review report examines the progress in implementing reforms during this transition
period. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements
from 2008. Previous reports can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org.

21.

The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data was
collected through a national survey of 2,500 respondents drawn from across all the
regions of the country. It also draws on data collected in earlier surveys. Qualitative data
was obtained through interviews with key informants drawn from Government
ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media and the
public at large. Secondary information was obtained by reviewing reports and documents
by the Government, development agencies, the media and non-governmental bodies.

22.

The review recognises too well that tracking progress of implementation of reforms is
bound to excite interest in various quarters. In writing the report, therefore, we have
taken care to remain objective and to let the data speak.

23.

The report adopts a thematic approach, reflecting key reform issues in the constitution
implementation process. The report is organised as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Part II: The Socio-Political Situation and the Challenge of Impunity
Part III: The Challenge of Resettling IDPs
Part IV: The Status of the Coalition Government
Part V: Challenges to the New Constitution
Part VI: Conclusion

2 Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties; Agenda Item 2:
Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis and promote healing and reconciliation; Agenda Item 3:
How to overcome the political crisis; and Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional
and institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities, youth unemployment, national cohesion, and
transparency and accountability.

2.

THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF

IMPUNITY
Introduction
24.
The KNDR agreement recognised that fighting impunity was essential if the country was
to address the root causes of violence. The mediation team noted that ‘the fight against
impunity must underpin the entire reform agenda.’ Consequently, the Grand Coalition
Government established the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
(chaired by Justice Philip Waki)3 to investigate the facts and circumstances related to the
post-election violence and to make recommendations on measures that should be taken
to prevent its recurrence. 4
25.

At the end of its mandate, CIPEV observed that ‘impunity lies at the heart of preventing
the kind of violence that has been witnessed in this country time and time again. The
eradication of impunity will, therefore, not only blow off the cover for persons who break
the law but also deter others who may contemplate similar deeds in future.’5 CIPEV
recommended setting up a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try those
responsible for the most serious criminal acts during the crisis period. It further
recommended that an envelope containing the names of suspected perpetrators be
handed to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the government failed to set up a
Special Tribunal.

26.

This review report comprises a summary of major issues that have arisen in the fight
against impunity thus far. It also documents public perceptions of the ICC and its
contribution to this endeavour.
The social economic context

27.

By the end of 2010 and in the first quarter of 2011, survey findings showed the sociopolitical and economic situation in Kenya had considerably improved compared to the
period just after the post-election violence in early 2008. Although incidents of violence
and crime were reported in some areas of the country, they did not result from political
disputes. From the surveys, many people felt safer than they did in early 2008.

28.

By the end of June 2011, only half of the respondents (50%) reported that they felt safer,
almost the equivalent of people who reported feeling safer in August 2009, one-and-ahalf years after the post-election violence. Public anxieties over the outcome of the ICC
intervention, the cultivation of ethno-political alliances, shifting ethnic coalitions, and
intensified competition for the 2012 General Election are causing concern because it is
not certain how the future will evolve. Moreover, these are the main fault lines that might
converge to cause conflict.

3

So named after Justice Philip Waki, who chaired the Commission
Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (Nairobi: Government
Printer, 2008)
5 Ibid, p. 444
4
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Figure 1: Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 General Election,
do you feel safe, less safe or about the same?

Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 general
election, do you feel safe, less safe or about the same? (by total)

1%

NR

14%

About the same

35%

Less safe

50%

Safer

0%

29.
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The high cost of living is the most serious problem facing Kenya today. Up to 68 per cent
of respondents feel that the high cost of living is the most serious problem, while 15 per
cent and 7 per cent think unemployment and corruption, respectively, are the main
challenges facing the country. People are also concerned about poor leadership. These
are certainly important challenges that must be confronted as the country moves towards
another General Election.
Table 1: What is the most serious problem facing Kenya today?
In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today?

30.

High cost of living

68%

Lack of employment/ Jobs

15%

Tribalism

2%

Corruption

7%

Poor leadership

5%

Insecurity

1%

Infrastructure

1%

Unemployment remains a significant problem in all parts of Kenya: up to 78 per cent of
respondents in the survey said availability of jobs had become worse than it was one year
before. High commodity prices in a context of unemployment, and increased food
insecurity particularly in poor urban households, contribute to public anxiety. Combined
with uncertainties resulting from limited progress in addressing the long-standing issues

3

that cause violence, these dynamics can converge to create political difficulties for the
country.
Table 2: How would you compare life today and one year ago regarding the following?
Much
worse

Somewhat
worse

About the
same

Somewhat
better

Much
better

DK/NR

Availability of jobs

55%

23%

10%

8%

2%

1%

Ability to buy food

75%

18%

3%

2%

0%

1%

Ability to get medical care

31%

21%

20%

22%

4%

1%

Ability to pay for education

37%

21%

18%

17%

5%

2%

Cost of living in general

81%

12%

3%

2%

1%

1%

31.

Concern over the high cost of living is reflected in the proportion of the population that is
able to access basic needs without difficulty: 93 per cent of respondents said their ability
to buy food had taken a turn for the worse over the past year. The data shows that only
about one quarter of respondents were happy with service delivery in the education and
health sectors, where 23 per cent and 26 per cent respectively said their ability to pay for
these services had improved.

32.

The data presented here show that the social-economic situation in the country had
considerably improved but that it is now beginning to decline. The escalating food prices
and rising inflation are issues that require urgent measures because their social
consequences could converge with other dynamics to prevent the undertaking of critical
reforms to support a peaceful and clean election.
Political Will to Fight Impunity: The Gap

33.

Lack of political will to fight impunity. After the signing of the National Accord and
formation of the Grand Coalition Government, there arose a debate on how to address
the post-election violence. Between March and April 2008, there was a debate on
whether to prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence or to grant them amnesty.
The ‘amnesty debate’ was the first point of dissonance in the Grand Coalition
Government on the matter of impunity. In general, PNU favoured prosecution of
suspects while ODM favoured amnesty. This issue continued to divide the coalition and
prevented the development of a common position on how to deliver accountability for
the post-election violence. The parties did not reconcile their positions or develop a
common approach on how to close the chapter on Kenya’s post-2007 election violence.
This failure to take a decisive position on post-election violence has transformed this
conflict into a major fulcrum around which politics and other events are revolving.

34.

PEV cases are poorly prosecuted or lack adequate evidence. The lack of commitment to
a common position on PEV has resulted in failure to hold suspected perpetrators of the
violence accountable. Of the 92 low-level suspects arrested in 2008, 19 were charged in
May 2009 in Eldoret. They were later acquitted for lack of evidence. The court argued
that the police had failed to establish a prima facie case against the accused, which would
require them to be put on trial. Similarly, in November 2009, a Nakuru court acquitted
three suspects for lack of evidence. These cases generally point to poor investigative and
prosecutorial capacity on matters around the post-election violence.

35.

Scepticism over the fight against impunity has increased: The failure to hold postelection violence perpetrators to account has increased public scepticism on commitment
to fight impunity for ordinary crime. For instance, some extortion gangs operate in urban
areas because low-level perpetrators were not arrested or made to account for their role
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in the post-election violence. Over half (54%) of those interviewed agree that police
officers know members of illegally armed groups but do not take any action against them.
Table 3: Thinking of illegal armed groups, do you agree or disagree with these statements?

Illegal armed groups will re-emerge during the 2012 general
election
Politicians finance illegal armed groups

Agree

Disagree

Don't
know

NR

42%

35%

22%

1%

19%

16%

1%

64%

There are no illegal armed groups in this area

48%

39%

The police know members of illegal groups

54%

22%

The illegal armed groups provide security to the local
people

22%

61%

12%
23%
16%

1%
1%
2%

36.

Illegal groups could become part of competitive politics: Previous reports have
mentioned that illegal armed groups are associated with politicians. Interviews also
revealed that senior politicians depend on these groups to fight off opponents. During the
period under review, many of those surveyed (64%) agreed that politicians finance illegal
armed groups. Yet, 42 per cent were convinced that these groups will re-emerge during
the 2012 General Election. This is a significant finding: it appears that illegal armed
groups are gradually becoming part of the culture of elections in Kenya, principally
because no gang members and leaders have been arrested or prosecuted. Their rapport
with senior political leaders has enabled some groups to operate with ease.

37.

Illegal groups are a threat to the security of communities: Although most extortion
gangs emerge by providing social services and protection in urban neighbourhoods, they
ultimately pose a security threat to community members by demanding protection fees.
In places such as Kibera in Nairobi, these groups have illegally occupied rental houses
belonging to persons displaced during the post-election violence or collect rent dues on
them. The groups control the security of affected parts of the informal settlement and
have thus entrenched themselves.6 Although community members may resort to illegal
groups when in need of protection in urban neighbourhoods, previous survey reports
show that many people prefer to receive security services from the police rather than
these groups. The failure to arrest and prosecute those involved in post-election violence
is likely to embolden the leaders of these groups, and especially those allied to senior
politicians.
Public perception of the International Criminal Court
The government has made little progress in holding high-level perpetrators
accountable, thus disillusioning the public: While the courts have dismissed several
cases involving low-level perpetrators of the violence for lack of evidence, three years on,
the government has made little progress in holding high level perpetrators to account. In
2009, and on two occasions, Parliament failed to pass a Motion to establish a Special
Tribunal for Kenya as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election
Violence (CIPEV). Despite having expressed unanimous support for implementing the
CIPEV report’s recommendations, MPs voted against the tribunal: some considered it
fatally flawed because of loopholes that allowed for presidential pardons, while others

38.

6

Interview with a member of the District Peace Committee, 12 May 2011

5

opposed it believing it might be effective and thus result in their prosecution or those of
their allies. The International Criminal Court appeared less threatening to them as it was
seen as likely to pursue only a handful of people in a process that could drag on for
years.7 The failure to set-up the tribunal invited the ICC intervention as recommended by
CIPEV.
39.

The ICC intervention in Kenya has aroused anxieties with political implications: The
identification of senior and influential politicians from the two main parties as the main
suspects in the ICC investigation into the violence has aroused political anxieties all
round. In December 2010 when the ICC Prosecutor named the six suspects, political
leaders quickly shifted their positions on the ICC and began to mobilise against its
intervention. This development hamstrung the reform agenda as political attention
shifted to strategies for securing political careers. On the whole, the intervention of the
ICC has continued to weaken the functioning of the Grand Coalition Government.

40.

The public is concerned that not all perpetrators are held accountable: The previous
review report noted that support for the ICC intervention was high. The public is
nonetheless concerned that not all perpetrators have been held accountable. Some would
have preferred to see low and middle level perpetrators arrested and successfully
prosecuted.

41.

Some people are unhappy about the ICC intervention; complacency is gradually
building: The length of time it is taking to resolve the issue of how to deal with postelection violence is generating public fatigue. Up to 38 per cent of respondents said they
are now unhappy about the ICC intervention. Some argue that not all perpetrators are
being held to account and that the low level perpetrators are yet to be arrested and
prosecuted. Others argue that it is taking long to bring justice to the victims. Still, there
are others who are unhappy because they think the ICC intervention has been politicised,
or that the local courts should try the suspects. Indeed, prior to honouring the April 2011
summons by the ICC, some of the suspects conducted rallies particularly in Rift Valley
Province, in which they pleaded their innocence. There were public claims that they had
been set up by their rivals to jettison their political careers ahead of 2012 General
Election.
Table 4: How happy/unhappy are you that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects?

Happy
Unhappy
Not sure
DK
RTA

Total
51%
38%
5%
4%
1%

Nairobi
59%
37%
2%
1%
1%

Coast
75%
14%
5%
7%
0%

North
Eastern
55%
21%
5%
11%
7%

Eastern
50%
38%
7%
5%
1%

Central
29%
60%
7%
4%
0%

Rift
valley
36%
55%
5%
3%
1%

Western
67%
23%
5%
4%
1%

Nyanza
69%
19%
5%
6%
1%

People in the regions that are home to some of the six suspects are unhappy with the
ICC; they appear more complacent: An analysis shows that regions from which the
suspects are drawn are more unhappy with the ICC compared to those where no one is
being called to account: in Central Province, 60 per cent are not unhappy with the ICC
while Rift Valley has 55 per cent expressing similar sentiments. Those outside these
regions are happy with the ICC. The regional pattern of approval and disapproval
suggests that the process of accountability is being politicised and ethnicised: criminal

42.
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accountability is viewed through ethnic lenses. The culture of impunity and the general
politicisation of the ICC intervention are responsible for this trend.
43.

Younger people are happy with the ICC: More young people (57%) below 24 years are
happy with the ICC compared to people aged over 45 years (47%). Similarly, more urban
dwellers (59%) are happy with the ICC compared to 47 per cent in rural areas. That is,
there are relatively more people in urban areas who are happy with the ICC than in rural
areas. This is an important observation: it suggests that people in rural and urban areas
have different perspectives on how people should be held to account.

44.

People want justice: Up to 36 per cent of those who are happy with the ICC think it is a
mechanism through which justice can be delivered to victims. Another 7 per cent think it
will end impunity and 4 per cent think it will help to reveal the truth about the postelection violence. Further, 71 per cent of respondents agree that ‘those supporting The
Hague/ ICC action are mainly concerned with getting justice for victims of the PEV’. Only
23 per cent disagree. These findings reveal that people still want the ICC intervention to
offer opportunities for delivering justice for the victims.

45.

Perceptions of unfair distribution of criminal responsibility are entrenched: Those who
are unhappy with the ICC intervention in Kenya allege that the list of suspects is not
complete and that the process has been politicised. The view by some people that the list
is incomplete is based on arguments that the violence occurred in several areas and,
therefore, suspects should be drawn from all the affected regions. Others observe that the
majority of the suspects are from one ethnic group, thus betraying a lack of ethnic
balance. Some people at the local level also argue that low-level perpetrators who carried
out the attacks bear the greatest responsibility. They do not perceive the influential
people as having been involved in these attacks. People do not see them as criminals;
they are their leaders. This aspect imbues the suspects with heroism. Perceptions of
unfair distribution of criminal responsibility continue to inform discourses of grievance
at the community level.

46.

Succession politics is shifting attention away from how to hold people to account: The
claims that the ICC ‘is being used’ to curtail the political ambitions of some of the
suspects has raised public anxiety about the possibility of future violence. Public anxiety
has been stoked by the ease with which rallies were mobilised before and after the visit to
The Hague, and the tone of the speeches made. The rallies revealed that Kenya’s political
culture has not changed since 2008. Divisions around the ICC are emerging as new fault
lines around which conflict could occur. Thus a trader in Eldoret noted: ‘I realise we
Kenyans as a people and our institutions have not learnt any lessons from 2008. We
are still entertaining thoughts of violence, because that is what we do during the
election year. This time my fear is worse because of the ICC.8 Indeed, the fear of violence
during the election year has been aggravated by local discourses of political exclusion and
victimisation of some communities. In particular, discourses linking the ICC to 2012
succession politics have shifted attention away from individual criminal responsibility.

47.

Not everyone thinks the ICC is politicised; many agree the ICC is about justice for
victims: The allegation that the ICC intervention has been captured by Kenyan politics is
having some impact in changing people’s perception about the ICC intervention as a tool
for delivering justice to the victims. Up to 53 per cent of the respondents agree that the
fight against impunity has political undertones: they agree that politicians supporting

8
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The Hague/the ICC action are mainly concerned with eliminating political opponents.
However, the majority believe that the ICC is about getting justice for the victims:
Table 5: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Those opposing The Hague/the ICC action are mainly trying to protect those
who organised the PEV
Those supporting The Hague/the ICC action in Kenya are mainly concerned
with getting justice for victims of the PEV
Politicians supporting the Hague/the ICC action are mainly concerned with
eliminating political opponents
If the six people named by The Hague/ICC prosecutor Ocampo are tried,
political violence in the next General Election will be less likely

48.

Agree

Disagree

NR

62%

38%

1%

71%

29%

1%

53%

46%

1%

64%

34%

2%

Some people in regions that are home to the six suspects are not concerned with getting
justice for victims: Respondents in regions where the six suspects hail from are more
inclined to feel that the ICC is designed to eliminate political foes and rivals ahead of
2012 rather than to fight impunity. Up to 70 per cent of respondents in Central, 62 per
cent in Rift Valley, and 63 per cent in Eastern agree that the ICC is about eliminating
political opponents. This contrasts with places such as Coast and Nyanza, where only 28
per cent and 36 per cent, respectively, agree with this statement. Significant, however, is
that well over half of the respondents across all ages and all ethnic groups agree that the
ICC is intended to get justice for victims.
Table 6: Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

… agreed with each of the following statements

Statements:

Those opposing The Hague/the ICC
action are mainly trying to protect
those who organised the PEV
Those supporting The Hague/the ICC
action in Kenya are mainly
concerned with getting justice for
victims of the PEV
Politicians
supporting
The
Hague/the ICC action are mainly
concerned with eliminating political
opponents
If the six people named by The
Hague/ICC prosecutor Ocampo are
tried, political violence in the next
General Election will be less likely

49.

Nairobi

Coast

North
Easter
n

Eastern

Central

Rift
valley

Western

Nyanza

62%

69%

82%

73%

66%

47%

44%

66%

78%

71%

78%

94%

64%

70%

55%

58%

79%

85%

53%

57%

28%

42%

63%

70%

62%

38%

36%

64%

78%

78%

56%

59%

57%

50%

64%

84%

Total

Many people in Coast Province (82%) feel that those opposed to the ICC are seeking to
protect those who organised the post-election violence. Still, Coast has relatively more
people (94%) than other regions who are concerned about getting justice for victims of
the post-election violence. Eastern, Rift Valley and Central have fewer people who agree

8

that the ICC is about justice for victims. In the Rift Valley, this perception is tied to
claims that local people also suffered during the post-election violence but have not
received any humanitarian assistance.9
Table 7: Choose one statement that is closest to your view.
Please choose one statement that is closest to your view?
Nyanza

Total

Nairobi

Coast

North
Eastern

Eastern

Central

Rift
valley

Western

The six suspects named by
the ICC prosecutor should
be tried by ICC in The
Hague

55%

60%

79%

75%

55%

29%

33%

74%

78%

The six suspects named by
the ICC prosecutor should
be tried by local tribunal in
Kenya

35%

35%

16%

19%

40%

58%

46%

22%

18%

The six suspects named by
the ICC prosecutor should
NOT be tried at all

9%

5%

5%

6%

4%

13%

20%

3%

5%

Statements:

50.

Up to 90 per cent of respondents want those responsible for the post-election violence to
be prosecuted -- either by the ICC or through a local tribunal in Kenya. This suggests that
there is high public support for accountability to end the culture of impunity.
Nonetheless, more people prefer the ICC to a local process, which means that public trust
in institutions such as the Judiciary and investigating bodies is still lacking. This also
implies that reforms undertaken in these institutions since the end of post-2007 election
violence have not been deep enough; they have been cosmetic..

51.

Support for a local tribunal is highest in areas where the ICC suspects come from -Central (58%), Rift Valley (46%) and Eastern (40%). More people in the suspects’ home
areas support the view by some politicians that suspects should not be tried at all, that
Kenyans need to forgive and forget or address the matter through non-punitive processes
such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).

52.

Past reports have indicated that national level political conflicts trickle to the local level.
In this regard, political support for the ICC at the national level is reflected in regions
associated with the leaders. For instance, public support for the ICC intervention is
strong in Nyanza, Eastern and Coast, where the Prime Minister has a strong following.
North Eastern Province supports an external process due to lack of confidence in local
institutions, given its long history of marginalisation and human rights abuses by state
security agents that have included massacres.

9

Interviews in Burnt Forest, June 2011

9

53.

ICC and peace and security ahead of 2012
Many people are of the view that violence will not occur if the ICC trials take place: Past
reports have shown that the ICC intervention does not pose a serious threat to peace and
stability in any part of Kenya. This view is still relevant. Up to 60 per cent of respondents
think violence will not occur if the ICC trials take place. Only 18 per cent think violence
will very likely occur.
Table 8: If the ICC trials take place, how likely do you think it is there will be violence?
Total

Nairobi

Coast

North
Eastern

Eastern

Central

Rift
valley

Western

Nyanza

Very likely

18%

11%

13%

10%

14%

33%

24%

14%

17%

Not likely

60%

73%

63%

44%

59%

43%

58%

75%

65%

Not sure

16%

14%

16%

23%

21%

19%

14%

8%

13%

DK

5%

2%

8%

19%

6%

5%

4%

3%

5%

54.

While the view that the ICC trials may not trigger violence is still widespread, public
perceptions appear to be changing as mobilisation for the 2012 General Election begins.
The naming of ethnic leaders as suspects may have negatively impacted on support for
prosecutions because local discourses have ethnicised the ICC intervention. Some people
in regions where the six suspects come from are not supportive of the trials; they are in
solidarity with their leaders.

55.

More than half of Kenyans are not confident that the police can to stop violence if it
occurs in 2012: The realisation that no substantive steps have been taken to fight
impunity for crimes committed in 2008 has increased fear that as 2012 approaches,
existing deterrent mechanisms and the police may not be adequate to stop the violence.
As many as 55 per cent of respondents are not confident that the police can stop violence
related to elections if it occurs.
Figure 2: How confident are you that the police can stop electoral violence if it occurs in
2012?

How confident are you that the police can stop political
violence related to elections if it occurs in 2012?
RTA
Don't know

1%
5%

Not confident
Confident

10

55%
38%

Regions differ in terms of confidence in the police: Western, Coast, Nyanza and Nairobi
have the least confidence in the ability of the police to stop violence if it occurs in 2012.
The construction of new police stations and patrol bases in the Rift Valley seems to have
only marginally increased public confidence in the ability of the police to stop violence.
These findings have implications for the police -- capacity must be improved to address
violence if it occurs.

56.

Table 9: How confident are you that the police can stop political violence related to elections
if it occurs in 2012?
Total

Nairobi

Coast

North
Eastern

Eastern

Central

Rift
valley

Western

Nyanza

Confident

38%

35%

50%

26%

43%

37%

41%

34%

31%

Not confident

55%

59%

41%

52%

51%

59%

53%

63%

64%

Don't know

5%

6%

8%

18%

5%

4%

4%

3%

5%

RTA

1%

0%

1%

4%

0%

1%

2%

0%

1%

57.

Protection of witnesses and their families is still important: After the naming of the
suspects, there have emerged local political discourses of victimisation in some
communities. Allegations of direct and veiled threats to witnesses to help protect one of
their own have increased. Human Rights institutions working with witnesses have
reported a resurgence of intimidation to those perceived to be witnesses, or their close
relatives.10 The arbitrary disappearance of suspected witnesses has caused fear among
human rights defenders.

58.

Negative social consequences such as ostracisation of families perceived to have
witnesses are evident: Some argue that there is covert intimidation of the families of
witnesses. Sometimes relatives of those perceived to be witnesses put pressure on the
families by warning them against bringing the wrath of the community upon their
households. They are perceived as ‘traitors’. Individual members of households are under
pressure from communities to demonstrate loyalty ‘to the community’ by not providing
information lest they be construed as betraying their cause.11 That is, families associated
with witnesses do not want to be viewed as enemies of the community; they are warning
their members against going against the community.12 In addition, there are simple,
everyday measures to discredit those viewed as witnesses. They are painted as
incorrigibly dishonest and out to extort money from the suspects. Such people and their
families are threatened with ‘a curse’ for attempting to give ‘false witness’ about events
that occurred during the 2007/ 2008 violence. It is said the curse will befall the witness
in question as well as members of their household for generations.13

59.

The suspects’ political supporters are mobilising community solidarity: The efforts
above appear to be attempts to mobilise local ethnic support and loyalty for some of the
suspects. Because of such efforts, some people at the local level are rethinking afresh
issues around the post-election violence. Some now believe that the atrocities committed
during the crisis were justified in the circumstances. Thus, they argue, nobody should be
punished for the role they played in defending the community. In Nakuru, a respondent
said: ‘We were being finished; something had to be done to control the situation.’ And in
Uasin Gishu, a respondent observed: ‘Why should the ‘suspect’ suffer, yet it is the people
10

Interview with human rights official in Uasin Gishu County, 11 June 2011
Interview with a youth leader, Uasin Gishu County, 11 June 2011
12 Interview with a young man in Uasin Gishu County, 14 June 2011
13 FGD in Uasin Gishu County, 13 June 2011
11
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and the community who were attacking? It is wrong and against our culture to isolate
one person and hold him criminally responsible.’ 14
Early preparation to prevent violence is critical: Early warning and preparedness
measures can prevent the recurrence of violence. For instance, the heavy deployment of
security forces during the 2010 referendum deterred violence because people were afraid
the police would use excessive force. Ethnic minorities temporarily migrated to safer
areas during the voting period. Interviews in much of the Rift Valley region indicate that
migration might be a common coping strategy during the ICC hearings as well as ahead
of 2012.

60.

Conclusions
61.
Lack of progress in addressing impunity is causing anxiety: National political
discourses linking succession politics to the ICC intervention in the Kenya situation have
increased public anxiety around uncertainties regarding the ICC outcome and the 2012
General Election. These fears are fanned by the lack of progress in addressing impunity
and undertaking reforms envisaged in 2008 to prevent the recurrence of violence. The
number of Kenyans feeling uncertain about future peace and stability has increased over
the past six months, and is bound to rise further as 2012 approaches. The more the
cleavages over succession politics at the national level and the ICC intervention, the more
the divisions at the local level, especially in multi-ethnic areas.
62.

The legacy of post-election violence will dominate Kenya’s political agenda in the
campaigns for 2012: The failure to fight impunity and the little progress made in
arresting and prosecuting middle and lower level perpetrators have made Kenyans
sceptical about political commitment to reforms in general. They also feel that very little
can be done between now and 2012, because the window for reforms has closed and
debate has shifted to the outcome of the ICC trials, as well as political positioning and
consolidation of ethnic alliances for 2012.

63.

Reform of the police force and institutional reforms in general are critical: Police and
institutional reforms were prioritised under the KNDR process but no comprehensive
policy and administrative changes have occurred in the police and the public service. The
changes effected in the police have not had a significant impact at the community level.
People are not confident that the police have the capacity to stop violence if it occurred in
2012. They believe the police will employ force as witnessed during the post-election
violence: attitudes and behaviour remain the same. Undertaking real and comprehensive
reforms within the police is imperative, and the need is urgent especially because the
period for the next election is around the corner.

14

Interview with a university student, Uasin Gishu County, 15 June 2011
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3.

THE CHALLENGE OF RESETTLING IDPs

Introduction
64.
The post-election violence spawned an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The National
Accord thus required the parties to resolve the crisis and promote reconciliation. To
achieve this, the government established the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement
in the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MOSSP) and also set up the
Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of post 2007
Election Violence (Humanitarian Fund) to finance assistance and resettlement activities.
In May 2008, the government launched Operation Rudi Nyumbani (Return Home) to
facilitate durable solutions for IDPs.
65.

Through Operation Rudi Nyumbani, about half of the displaced persons have been able
to go back to their homes and 384 refugee households have returned to Kenya from
Uganda. The government has disbursed Ksh7.977 billion to pay relief and assistance
funds to help IDPs start up their lives, reconstruct their damaged homes, and reestablish their livelihoods.

66.

In March 2010, the Ministry of Special Programmes formulated a national policy for
IDPs, the ‘National Policy on the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection
and Assistance to IDPs in Kenya’. The draft, which provides guidelines for the protection
and assistance to all categories of IDPs and persons forcibly displaced by various causes,
has been awaiting Cabinet debate and approval for more than a year.

67.

Previous review reports have showed that the resettlement programme has faced many
challenges, notably ineffective inter-ministerial coordination and allegations of
embezzlement of funds meant for IDPs. Thus, despite allocating large sums of money to
the resettlement programme, some IDPs continue to live in camps and other settings.
The number of those waiting for funds, shelter or land allocation does not seem to
diminish.

68.

This report provides a brief analysis of the problem of securing durable solutions for
IDPs. It is noted here that lack of a policy framework, infiltration of non-IDPs into
camps, landlessness and perceived favouritism of IDPs from one community confound
efforts to find durable solutions.

Operation Rudi Nyumbani
69.
The government has facilitated the return of refugees from Uganda and the return of
IDPs; but 256 families are still refugees in Uganda: According to records from the
Ministry of Special Programmes, 350,000 IDPs left their temporary shelters and
returned to their homes.15 Those who felt insecure settled in transit camps near their
homes, from where they commuted by day to cultivate their farms. The government has
facilitated the return of 384 households from Uganda; each returning household is given
Ksh37,000 for logistical support. Another 256 families are still in Uganda and are
expected to return to Kenya by the end of 2011.16

15 Data provided by the Ministry of Special Programmes; see also presentation by the Permanent Secretary at the
forum with members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs, 23 May 2010
16 Interview with senior official at the Ministry of Special Programmes, 23 May 2011
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There are reporting procedures to ensure transparency in the way administrators
disburse funds: By the end of May 2011, the government had disbursed ex-gratia support
of Ksh2, 262,290,000 to District Commissioners to pay IDPs. The money has been
sourced from the government exchequer, grants, donations and a loan from the African
Development Bank. To address the problem of corruption in the disbursement of funds,
District Commissioners are required to account for the money. They file returns for
monies they have received and disbursed.17 The Ministry of Special Programmes also
supports the restoration of farm infrastructure and the rural livelihoods project, through
which IDPs receive seeds, fertilises and farm inputs.

70.

The IDPs in camps and where they come from
71.
Some IDPs are still in camps because they were landless or were small traders before
the violence: At the start of Operation Rudi Nyumbani in 2008, IDPs moved into 110
transit camps, mostly in the Rift Valley. Those in the transit camps will benefit from the
shelter reconstruction and livelihoods projects. By the end of May 2011, government
records showed that there were only eight camps remaining in Kuresoi District. Some
IDPs are in camps awaiting reconstruction of their homes while others were landless and
have no farms to go to. Still, there are those who ran small businesses before the violence
but are unable to re-start them.
Table 10: Transit camps
Transit camp

No. of HH18

Remarks / observations19

1
2

Kamara DO’s camp
Casino/Mosque Total

34
36

Original camps, formed Jan 2008
Landless IDPs; traders before displacement

3
4

Kamara Centre
Kamuri

10
3

No camp; one tent left
No camp; one tent remaining

5

Langwenda

16

Waiting home reconstruction, some landless

6

Karirikania

6

Waiting shelter construction, some squatters

7
8

Keringet DO’s office
Moto

41
13

Mostly single mothers; traders
No camp; live in donated houses

72.

The ministry does not recognise all transit camps. In Uasin Gishu County, there are four
such camps: Kamuingi, Sakasaka, Naka and Maili Nne. IDPs in these camps do not own
land. Most were squatters in Keiyo and Nandi districts. By the time they registered their
self-help groups, the deadline for recognition of such groups by the MoSSP had lapsed. 20
Similar groups are in Naivasha and Nyandarua districts and include New Canaan, Maua,
Tumaini, Neema and Huruma.21

73.

Categories of IDPs: At the end of the emergency around 2008, the Early Recovery
Cluster categorised IDPs according to livelihoods they pursued before displacement in
order to expedite the search for durable solutions. The Cluster recognised that majority
of the IDPs were farmers. However, not all farmers owned land; some were squatters or
leased farms while living in urban areas. Farmers could be helped to return to their
land, and most did return during Operation Rudi Nyumbani. Farmers who have not
17

Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Special Programmes, 23 May 2011
No of Households; Source: MOSSP records
19 Conducted during an assessment mission in June 2011
20Interview at MoSSP, 8 May 2011; interviews in Naivasha and Naka camp in Eldoret. Most IDPs in self-help
groups that have not been formally recognised by the ministry complain that the failure to assist them because it
delayed disbursing funds that they needed to purchase land.
21 Fieldwork conducted in June 2011
18
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returned to their farms, such as in Kondoo 1-3 Farm, or Kamuyu or Nyakinyua farms,
have leased out their land or hired labourers to cultivate the land. Majority of landowners
returned to their farms or have access to the farm from nearby urban centres. Those who
were too traumatised to return have either sold or exchanged their land and bought new
parcels or integrate in areas of refuge.
74.

Displaced landless people without any means to lease land are still in camps: Landless
farmers who could return to lease land in pre-displacement areas did so in 2008.
However, there are landless farmers who lost the chance to lease land due to ethnic
tensions or landlords leasing to other people during the period of encampment. These
farmers have relocated to new areas where they continue to lease land. Some pooled their
share of Ksh10,000 and bought land in central Rift Valley, notably in Naivasha and
Nakuru. Those who did not have any means constitute the IDPs still in camps

75.

There are IDPs who were traders: There are displaced business people or traders who
lost all their stock during the violence. Some of the traders did not own land or houses.
They lived in leased business premises, from which they were ejected or their stocks
looted. Those among them who had capital have since re-established their businesses
elsewhere. Those who lost everything or were unable to recover are still in the camps.
Examples are those who ran businesses in towns where shops were razed such as Mau
Summit. Others can be found at the Keringet DC’s office. Artisans such as mechanics and
tailors also lost their work tools and have not re-established their livelihoods. Most
business people are yet to receive support because the government’s livelihood recovery
programme, through a UNDP grant, is tailored for farmers. The government does not
compensate IDPs who were traders.

76.

Other IDPs included the squatters displaced in the previous waves of displacement.
Unemployed people and the urban poor, including the homeless, were displaced during
the violence. When Operation Rudi Nyumbani was launched and camps were
dismantled, IDPs who had somewhere to go left the camps. A large number of IDPs were
urban dwellers who had lived in rented housing. Some of these IDPs formed cooperative
societies, or ‘self-help groups’ and collectively purchased large parcels of land, which they
then subdivided into small plots. Concerned that this could create ‘slums in rural areas’,
the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement at the Ministry of Special Programmes
decided to support their efforts by buying for them economically viable pieces of land, on
which social services could also be planned. 22 Thus, steps to allocate land to 6,802
households in 19 ‘self-help groups’ was mooted in 2009.

77.

The government has found land for 1,337 households, at the following farms:

22

Interview with senior official MoSSP, 23 May 2011
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Table 11: Settled self-help groups
Where settled

No. of Houses
constructed

No. of families settled

Giwa Farm
Managu Farm

444
56

441
56

Mau Summit Block

141

141

Rwangondu /66

-

Rwangondu/67
Rwangondu/69

31

37

Nyandarua/Kiambaga/2
Asanyo Farm

49
-

49
91

-

41

-

225

Marmanet/ Melwa/1497 & Marmanet/
Melwa/1365
Kenjoketty/4
Endebbes/Kapkoi
Total households settled

30

1,337

78.

The government did not explain the allocation criteria; squatters and others who did
not have land moved to camps awaiting their share: The land allocation policy was not
explained to all stakeholders, including government officials in other ministries.23 The
fact that the government was allocating land to landless IDPs aroused interest from other
IDPs, as every other landless IDP demanded similar consideration. At the same time,
squatters who were not displaced demanded land. Ultimately, majority poor land-hungry
people claimed to be IDPs in order to access land from the government. This caused a
sudden increase in new camps – two years after the formal closure of PEV camps. It also
occasioned an increase in the registration of ‘self-help groups’ by landless IDPs and
others eager to benefit from the land allocation. Camps such as Ngeteti in Nyandarua and
Wanaruona in Naivasha were formed in 2011. The apparent attempt to benefit from
displacement has caused claims that some IDPs are not genuine.

79.

Land allocation to IDPs has had several other negative consequences. IDPs in self-help
groups who had not received any assistance from the government began to agitate for
expedient resettlement. They complained that those in the 19 self-help groups had
received more than their share of assistance – they already had the humanitarian fund
(both the Ksh10,000 start-up fund and Ksh25,000 re-housing fund), continued food
distribution, access to fertilisers and seed every season since 2008, their houses had been
built for them and they have received land. This focus on one group of IDPs is perceived
as unfair considering thousands of IDPs are still waiting to receive part of the money.24
Similarly, those living with relatives and friends or invisibly in urban areas have not been
systematically assisted.25

23Some raise concern that the policy was not explained, including how the decision was reached: Interview with
senior government official in the Ministry of State for Internal Security and Provincial Administration, 6 June
2011
24 FGDs in Kiambi, Tumaini, Neema, Amani Ndogo camps in Naivasha District, 3-5 June 2011
25 Discussion at a forum with members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs, 23 May
2011
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80.

There is concern that the government is biased in favour of IDPs from some
communities: Concern that most of the beneficiaries of the land allocation programme
are from one ethnic group has generated resistance against it. In the Rift Valley,
resentment is rife over the fact that members of one community whose homes were burnt
or who were injured have not been assisted. This has undermined peace efforts,
particularly in areas such as Kamuyu where houses have been reconstructed. Some
people in the area observe: ‘Our problem is not that they (IDPs) have been given
houses… we feel bad because we also suffered, our houses were burnt, but nobody has
assisted us.’26These claims of biases on ethnic lines could be the result of deep mistrusts
and common discourses of exclusion that deepen animosity between communities. The
discourses firm up especially when people are not given facts or explanations on how the
reconstruction exercise is undertaken.

81.

Those evicted by the government are also demanding land before IDPs are resettled:
Persons evicted from forests in order to conserve the environment and who are living in
informal settlements around Mau, Embobut and other forests are demanding land before
IDPs ‘from outside’ can be resettled on parcels considered to be their ancestral land. The
Ministry of Special Programmes and the Lands ministry intend to settle 7,500 forest
evictees. Some Ksh1.4b has been set aside for their resettlement. However, the focus on
Mau Forest has provoked fears of exclusion among those evicted in earlier efforts to evict
squatters from forest reserves such as Nabkoi Forest in Uasin Gishu and other locations
in Nandi District. Similarly, evictees from Kipkurere, Ngatikong, Kasabei, Sengalu and
others are seeking resettlement and have compiled registers of affected households.27

82.

Communities are resisting IDPs’ resettlement in areas they consider their ancestral
land: Allocating land to IDPs has triggered interest regarding the criteria used to
determine which landless people are settled. Because of this, there are those who argue
that the government is using displacement as a smokescreen to give land to members of
one community at the expense of deserving local landless people, including forest
evictees. In effect, communities have risen up to resist the resettlement of IDPs on ‘their’
ancestral land. They claim that there are IDPs and landless people in areas where the
government has procured land. Belated consultations with community leaders and
members of IDP communities before resettlement have not resolved these concerns. In
places such as Chemusian in Eldoret, Endebbes in Trans-Nzoia and Tippis in Mau
Narok, local people threatened to seize and occupy the land allocated to IDPs.

26
27

FGD in Kamuyu area, Burnt Forest, 11 June 2011
Interviews and FGDs in North Rift, June 2011
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Figure 3: Are communities justified to reject IDPs? Yes, because ...

Are these communities justified to reject resettlement of IDPs?
Yes, because ... (by total)
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83.

Not all Kenyans support rejection of IDPs resettlement in what is considered as other
people’s area. Up to 42 per cent of respondents said they were aware of IDPs being
rejected. Over half those who are aware feel those who reject resettlement of IDPs in
their area are not justified to do so. One point to stress here then is that rejection of IDPs
is linked to identities and demand to control resources on the basis of exclusive
identities. It generally reflects concerns about access to resources, particularly land. As
Kenya transitions into the new constitution with a devolved government expected at the
local level and the 2012 elections approach, IDPs are being perceived as voters whose
political support can change political balance at the local level. But of concern are the
growing trends to exclude communities on the basis of ethnicity. This is more
pronounced on matters of politics and therefore access to resources at the local level.
This trend has the consequence of creating super minorities at the county level.

84.

Many people would like IDPs to be resettled in the places where they were displaced
from: As many as 42 per cent of respondents consider the place where IDPs were evicted
from to be their home. Another 23 per cent believe the home of IDPs is anywhere in
Kenya while 13 per cent think it is where they have bought land and settled. Only a small
group – 21 per cent -- believe the home of IDPs is in their ancestral districts. These
findings suggest that local leaders who mobilise communities to reject IDPs are the main
obstacle to resettlement efforts and even reconciliation. Kenyans generally do not mind
IDPs being resettled where they were displaced from or anywhere else in the country.
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Figure 4: Where do you consider to be home for IDPs?

where do you consider to be home for IDPs?

Any part of Kenya
Where they have bought land/property and
settled since being
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85.

86.

21%

Conclusion
Resettlement efforts have not considered all categories of IDPs: The government has
allocated resources for the resettlement of IDPs. However, the number of camps and
displaced households does not seem to reduce. This is due to lack of a comprehensive
policy to address the needs of all categories of IDPs, a challenge made more complex by
the lack of comprehensive and disaggregated data on IDPs. The decision by the Ministry
of Special Programmes to allocate land to landless IDPs has opened a Pandora’s Box, as
other landless people including squatters have also demanded land. Resentment over
perceived favouritism of IDPs from one community and inadequate consultation with
communities in regions where the government has purchased land for resettlement have
triggered rejection of IDPs, hence protracting displacement and encampment. But local
leaders are responsible for these trends in the rejection of IDPs resettlement. Ordinary
Kenyans do not mind IDPs being resettled.
There are land-hungry imposters seeking to cash in on government support for IDPs:
As 2012 elections approach, the government needs to take immediate measures to
unravel the identity and origin of all the IDPs in camps. A number of land-hungry
imposters seeking to benefit from government assistance programmes have infiltrated
camps, while original households have multiplied because adult children register
individual households. The government should also profile the IDPs according to
livelihoods or land ownership in order to assess recovery needs and provide support
towards achieving appropriate durable solutions.
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4. THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND REFORMS

Introduction
87.

The agreement on the principles of partnership of the Coalition Government signed by
the two parties – PNU and ODM -- stipulated that power sharing was not an end in itself
but a means to achieving reforms that would prevent future violence. It was ‘not about
creating positions that reward individuals.’28 It was about ‘enabling leaders to look
beyond partisan considerations with a view to promoting the greater interests of the
nation as whole.’ In addition, the agreement committed the parties ‘to work together as
true partners, through constant consultations and willingness to compromise,’ in order
to undertake fundamental and critical reforms.

88.

With power sharing and no formal opposition party in Parliament, it was expected that
the government would be in a position to make hard decisions and undertake important
reforms expeditiously. Political will, consultations and willingness to compromise were
underlined as necessary for the passage of critical laws.

89.

Since its formation, the government has not been able to cultivate adequate consensus
and cohesion. As previous review reports have shown, this has slowed the pace of
reforms and entrenched the public perception of ‘two-governments-in-one’. Ethnic,
sectarian and political interests have overridden the reform agenda. Combined, narrow
partisan interests are informing implementation of reforms, thereby slowing their pace.

90.

This section of the report examines the status of the coalition government. It looks at
coherence within the Coalition Government, how critical reforms have been undertaken
and how lack of cohesion and consensus has impacted on the implementation of reforms.
It examines the main achievements and challenges of the Coalition Government.
Power sharing government and implementation of reforms

91.

Failure to compromise is a threat to reforms: In coalition governments, the elites’
political will to compromise, consult and negotiate is critical for moving forward with the
reform agenda. Unity of purpose is central in this respect. Elites are required to
transcend ethnic and personal differences to further reforms. Failure to compromise and
overcome parochial differences weakens not only the coalition, but also threatens
implementation.

92.

The two Principals have projected an image of ‘a unified executive’: Since its formation
three years ago, the Grand Coalition has faced challenges of cohesion that have slowed
the implementation of reforms. Lack of cohesion between the two partners and even
within the parties that form the government, as well as in Parliament have tended to
constrain implementation of reforms, including those in the new constitution. However,
in recent times, both the President and Prime Minister have projected an image of ‘a
unified executive’ or centre of power; they have avoided open acrimony. They have
publicly pledged to support implementation of the constitution and acted together over
the staffing of senior positions in the Judiciary by endorsing recommendations of the
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The image of ‘one executive’ has created conductive
conditions for speeding up implementation of the new constitution. Unfortunately, the
image of partnership that they have demonstrated is not evident among their key
supporters within Parliament.
28Agreement
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on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, available at www.dialoguekenya.org

The public rates the two factions differently: The public is generally sensitive to the
acrimonious debates between the two coalition partners. In the past, the public has
generally viewed the coalition as ‘two-governments-in-one’ – a largely divided one
without a common purpose. This is usually reflected in the ratings the government
receives with regard to performance in a number of areas. People tend to rate the two
sides of the coalition differently.

93.

Table 12: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with with Kibaki-PNU and Raila-ODM with
regard to the following issues
PNU

ODM

Dissatisfied

Satisfied

DK

Dissatisfied

Satisfied

DK

Prosecution of PEV
perpetrators

58%

36%

6%

47%

48%

5%

Fighting corruption

63%

33%

3%

54%

43%

Lowering the price of
essential
commodities

78%

18%

3%

72%

25%

Fighting tribalism

65%

29%

4%

58%

38%

3%

3%
4%

94.

People are most dissatisfied with the two partners with regard to their failure to lower
the prices of essential commodities: The respondents rated the government poorly on its
ability to lower the prices of essential commodities. People are also dissatisfied with the
two partners’ commitment to fight corruption and impunity. In other words, there is a
high sense of dissatisfaction with the government’s commitment to important political
reforms: corruption, impunity or post-election violence, and tribalism. These are the
major fault lines of conflict that require managing as the country moves towards the 2012
elections.

95.

Lack of common positions on critical national issues such as corruption and the ICC
intervention has deepened the fault lines: The partners in the coalition have not taken a
collective stand on how to manage the ICC process or fight against corruption. From
December 2010 when the ICC identified six suspects for prosecution, the Principals and
their parties have issued contradictory and opposing views on the position of the
Coalition Government. While those in PNU have argued for deferral of the Kenyan case
and even lobbied the African Union and United Nations Security Council to assist in
attaining this goal, ODM declined to support the initiative, arguing that the Cabinet did
not resolve to do so. They dismissed the effort as a partisan and personal agenda. The
government had also challenged the admissibility of the six ICC cases but ODM has said
it is not party to these efforts.

96.

Divisions within government are reflecting on critical decisions: Lack of consensus on
important issues exposes reforms to politics. Individual leaders tend to drive reforms on
narrow considerations – the reforms are identified with the party or individuals in the
coalition, thereby reducing their significance. Success or failure of reforms is thus
attributed to individuals rather than the Coalition Government: ‘whenever a taskforce is
formed within a ministry, it is labelled either PNU or ODM depending on the minister’s
party… bureaucratic support to the taskforces is also dependent on the agenda of the task
force or even the minister driving it’.29 For this reason, some MPs support or oppose
parliamentary Bills on the basis of parochial considerations, including the minister’s
party. This has undermined the parties’ capacity to make hard decisions on important

29

Interview with a policy analyst and academic, 7 June 2011
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national issues.
97.

Divisions delay decisions and lead to horse trading: Government operations are also
suffering from these divisions and conflicts in the coalition. Divisions in the government
tend to delay decision-making: ‘Divisions delay making of decisions and
implementation of key activities ... Decisions tend to be influenced by succession politics
and horse trading among partners’.30 Some of the officials interviewed also noted that
‘there is absence of good faith, which is necessary for true and genuine bi-partisanship
… absence of good faith has contributed to unnecessary suspicions.”31

98.

There is no institutionalised mechanism for resolving disputes within the coalition: Lack
of structures to build consensus and cohesion within the coalition has led to the conflicts
escalating and affecting reforms. The Permanent Committee on the Management of
Coalition Affairs has not been effective. This body, comprising Cabinet ministers from
both parties, would have created an enabling environment for the formulation and
implementation of important reforms and for resolving disputes.

99.

Kenyans want the two principals to work together: Generally, Kenyans want the
coalition to work as one government. They want to see a sense of togetherness in order to
prevent conflict. Indeed, when asked what the coalition government can do to work
better until the next elections, 40 per cent of Kenyans say the Principals should consult
and work together. 29 per cent want the political leaders to be united.
Figure 5: Please tell me ONE thing that the coalition government can do to work better until
next General Election?

The inability to have a common position on key governance reforms is dividing the
government yet again: Conflicts over power sharing have resurfaced, especially with
appointments to the new offices created under the 2010 constitution. Some of the
politicians in PNU argue that the two Principals are not legally equal and that the
President has the final word on key decisions. In addition, they argue that the

100.

30
31

Interview with a government official, 16 June 2011
Interview with a senior government official, 3 June 2011
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requirement for consultations does not imply consensus, something they say is difficult
to achieve. However, ODM argue that the spirit of the National Accord, as well as the
transitional clauses in the constitution state that the Prime Minister and President
should consult and agree on key decisions. To them, the spirit of the new constitution is
far more critical and ought to be respected. Polarisation resulting from these disputes has
rapidly shifted the focus of the debate away from reforms to consolidation of political
power and ethnic interests.
101.

People’s confidence in government has reduced; some feel they like nothing about the
Coalition Government: These arguments over power sharing have obstructed
implementation of reforms and the fight against impunity, impacting on people’s
confidence in the Coalition Government in service delivery. When asked about what they
perceived as the main achievements of the Coalition Government, 35 per cent of
respondents said ‘nothing.’
Figure 6: What do you like most about the Coalition Government?

102.

The constant wrangles within government have diverted energies from service delivery,
leading to disillusionment with the public. Indeed, 33 per cent of respondents cite
political wrangles within the coalition as one of the failures of the government. Another
46 per cent cite failure to arrest high food prices as its main failure.
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Figure 7: What do you dislike most about the Coalition Government?

103.

People dislike the Coalition Government because of the high cost of living: Across the
regions, all the respondents named high food prices as the main failure of the coalition. It
is important for the coalition to urgently address the concern of high food prices since, as
it has been seen elsewhere, it is a source of civil tension and instability.
Table 13: What do you dislike most about the Coalition Government? (Across the regions)

High
commodity
prices
Failure to
fight
corruption
Political
wrangles
Failure to
deal with
insecurity
Failure to
resettle IDPs
Dont know

104.

Nairobi

Coast

North
Eastern

Eastern

Central

Rift
valley

Western

Nyanza

27%

51%

39%

49%

49%

45%

53%

53%

9%

9%

30%

13%

13%

8%

10%

8%

53%

33%

20%

27%

28%

37%

28%

32%

3%

1%

10%

2%

4%

5%

3%

2%

5%

2%

2%

3%

5%

2%

3%

1%

1%

1%

0%

1%

0%

2%

3%

1%

Disagreements among leaders stemming from personal and ethnic interests undermine
public considerations. The partners and the various factions appear to compete on what
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reforms to support and how to implement them.32 This is affecting objective
implementation of the constitution. This was evident during the parliamentary debate on
the vetting of nominees for the positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and
Director of Public Prosecutions. While the names for the Chief Justice and his Deputy
were widely accepted, individuals and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) raised integrity
questions with regard to the nominee for the post of DPP. The allegations against the
DPP were debated in and out of Parliament in ethnic and political tones.33 Some were
oblivious to the fact that the new institutions are pillars of the nation and that public
officials occupying them are trustees of the Kenyan public.
105.

Ethnic and partisan considerations are besmirching new institutions of governance:
The new institutions created by the constitution risk losing public support when
parochial and ethnic considerations shape how they are established. Again, the
nomination of the DPP and how MPs debated it clearly shows that politics has the
potential of undermining the reputation of these institutions. In Parliament, MPs vilified
those who had brought the allegations against the nominee for the post of DPP.34 In
addition, a section of MPs threatened to decline supporting nominees for the Judiciary if
the nominee for DPP was not approved.35 In the end, debate over the DPP appointment
polarised the political elite along personal and ethnic lines. These disputes shifted the
focus of the debate away from reforms to the consolidation of power. It also revealed that
Kenya is yet to transcend from the older order to a new one.

106.

The process of vetting state officials is highly approved: The judicial and prosecution
office holders were the first to be vetted and hired under the new constitution. The
exercise offered important lessons for the future as the constitution implementation
process continues. Most of the political elites are yet to embrace the spirit of the
constitution.36 Ethnicity and party loyalties are still driving their decision making. To
effectively insulate the country from ethnicity and political considerations, the vetting
bodies will be required to build capacity, including in areas such as interviewing of
candidates, among others.

107.

The bureaucracy is not neutral: Within the government, the bureaucracy is exerting its
influence through divisions within the coalition.37 There are turf wars among bureaucrats
in various ministries. Their aim is to influence the drafting of legislation that touches on
their ministries.38 Because of this competition and general absence of coherence in
government, it is possible that they will draft weak legislation mostly because they want
the status quo to remain.39

108.

Interest in how legislation is drafted is fuelling conflicts: Some argue that interest in
drafting legislation is the main factor informing the internal conflicts in the
parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and the Administration of Justice. The MPs
would want to chair the committee or have a majority number to protect personal
interests that may be threatened by the new constitution. The committee became
dysfunctional owing to internal conflicts among members who were divided along party
lines. The divisions prevented the committee from performing its tasks. The Speaker of
the National Assembly had to pass some of the responsibilities to the Constitutional
Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC).

32

Interview with a Senior Counsel, 8 June 2011
‘Ntimama now asks Parliament to approve Tobiko,’ The Star, 14 June 2011
34 ‘ Baraza and Tobiko get house nod’, Daily Nation, 15 June 2011
35 ‘Nominees: Tobiko’s approval divides MPs,’ The Standard, 14 June 2011
36 Interview with a Senior Counsel, 8 June 2011
37 Interview with a policy analyst, 2 June 2011
38 Interview with a government official, 16 June 2011
39 Interview with a committee member of the devolution taskforce, 2 June 2011
33
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109.

Kenyans want focused leadership: Perhaps because of these divisions, many Kenyans
prefer focused leadership to ‘ethnic’-based political alliances. Asked what kind of
leadership they wanted, 62 per cent of respondents said they wanted a focused leadership
in power rather than an ethnic-based alliance.
Figure 8: Please choose one statement that is closest to your view.

110.

Honesty and integrity – or Chapter Six of the Constitution – are highly regarded as
values for leadership of the county government. Most people rank integrity and
transparency high on the qualities of the person they would choose as a Governor in the
next elections.
Figure 9: What should be the most important quality of a county governor?
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Conclusion
111.

Conflicts within the coalition will slow reforms; but the new Constitution will outlive
them: Conflicts within the Coalition Government will continue slowing down decision
making. But the new constitution has mechanisms to insulate itself from the
consequences of these conflicts. Public litigation measures and oversight on the
government are important in this respect.

112.

Compromise and consultation between the two Principals is critical at this stage: The
solution to the main problems of implementing reforms lies in consultations between the
two Principals. Divisions between them and a perception that they are not ‘together’ is
creating opportunities for entrenching the status quo or drafting weak legislation because
of the fear of change.

113.

Ethnic-based interests have resurfaced: The constitutional reforms were intended to
eliminate the salience of ethnicity in politics. The constitution does this by defining the
nature and functions of the state, aiming at an inclusive nation in which members of all
communities are represented and play a part. In addition, the constitution emphasises
on a Kenyan identity and nation building, in which ethnicity will be respected but only as
part of the cultural richness of the country. Hence, in the debate on the appointment of
office holders, emphasis should be on Kenyan citizenship, national unity and service to
the nation. Aspects of integrity, transparency and impartiality are critical for the current
implementation process and must take precedence over ethnicity.

114.

Unity of purpose in Parliament is critical for passing important Bills: Parliament’s unity
of purpose is urgently needed especially at this time when it is supposed to pass critical
Bills that will ensure the country has free and fair elections devoid of any violence.
Politicians need to recall the underlying foundations of the coalition, that no party could
govern without the other -- hence progress in the reform agenda will not be realised if
they refuse to accomodate each other. The future stability of the country is tied to the full
implementation of the new constitution. Hence, all efforts need to be geared towards this
agenda.

115.

The clock is ticking fast towards the next General Election. Hard decisions have to be
made. Institutional deficiencies that led to the 2007/8 violence are supposed to be
addressed with the constitution, which was passed by a majority vote. If they are not
addressed, the country risks being plunged into chaos once again. Key among these
reforms is the transforming the judiciary and police, as well as delivering on the entire
Agenda 4 framework that identified the root causes of the violence. It is thus important
that all players exhibit sobriety so that the process can be steered to fruition. It is
important that all stakeholders stay faithful to the process.
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5. THE NEW CONSTITUTION: LONG TERM ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS

116.

Introduction
It is now widely acknowledged that institutional failure and the divisions emanating from
Kenya’s constitutional review process in 2005 contributed to the post-2007 election
violence. The KNDR agreement underscored the importance of undertaking far-reaching
reforms in order to move the country forward.

117.

In particular, Agenda Item 4 recognised the importance of fast-tracking constitutional
and institutional reforms as well as other issues around which Kenyans were divided.
Land reforms, tackling unemployment and addressing regional development imbalances
were identified as critical aspects of the reform agenda for the Coalition Government.
Important also, in this respect, was the need to consolidate national cohesion and unity,
and attack the cause of impunity by embedding reforms that would promote a culture of
accountability and transparency in public affairs.

118.

In line with Agenda Item 4, a new constitution was promulgated in August 2010. The
new constitution has fundamentally altered the structure of government and governance,
especially by providing for national and county governments. There are new legislative
bodies and an electoral system to address the problem of representation of groups that
have traditionally been marginalised and are vulnerable. The constitution had selfimposed deadlines on drafting of key legislation. It also imposes certain sanctions on
various state officers and institutions if they fail to meet these deadlines.

119.

August 2011 will mark one year after the promulgation of the constitution. It is
important, therefore, to examine the progress of implementation of the constitution as
well as other reforms that would prevent another crisis. This section of the report thus
discusses progress in implementing the constitution and institutional reforms in general.

Constitution implementation process
120.
A number of independent institutions to undertake and oversee the implementation of
the new constitution have been established. The government is in the process of
developing various policy and legislative frameworks for the comprehensive
implementation of the constitution. The government established the Constitutional
Implementation Commission (CIC) on 30 December 2010 with a mandate to oversee,
monitor and facilitate the implementation of the new constitution.40 The commission has
set up its secretariat and established networks with various stakeholders engaged in
implementing the constitution.41
121.

Schedule 5 of the constitution lists 16 laws that must be enacted by 27 August 2011.
However, by early June 2011, only three Bills have been passed into law: the Judicial
Service Act; the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act; and the Supreme Court Act. The
CIC has further identified priority laws that should be passed by August 2011.42

40

Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Act
http://cickenya.org.
42 CIC. Agreed timelines for the development of priority Bills for the period ending 30 August 2011.
http://cickenya.org
41
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Table 14: Name, timeline and status of Schedule 5 Bills
Bill

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Constitutional
(Schedule5)
Deadlines

New
(CIC)
deadlines

Status

26 August 2011

15 May 2011

Awaiting presidential assent

26 August 2011

03 July 2011

3 Bills under review

Legislation on Citizenship

26 August 2011

25 August 2011

Ethics and Anti-Corruption

26 August 2011

17 July 2011

Legislation on Elections

26 August 2011

08 July 2011

Electoral Disputes

26 August 2011

Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission
Kenya National Human
Rights and Equality
Commission

Legislation on Political
Parties
Vacation of Office of
Member of Parliament Bill

26 August 2011

26 June 2011

43

Undergoing internal review
& stakeholder consultations
Undergoing internal review
& stakeholder consultations
Undergoing internal review
& stakeholder consultations
Merged into the Elections
Bill
Awaiting approval by
Cabinet

26 August 2011

Power of Mercy

26 August 2011

30 May 2011

System of Courts

26 August 2011

28 August 2011

Supreme Court Act enacted
22 June 2011

Removal from Office
Legislation on Vetting of
Judges and Magistrates
Schedule
Speaker of County Assembly
Bill

Vetting of Judges and
Magistrates Act passed, 21
March 2011

26 August 2011
26 August 2011

Urban areas and Cities Bill

26 August 2011

Contingencies Fund

26 August 2011

Loan Guarantees by National
Government

26 August 2011

14 August 2011

43 Article 59 of the constitution provides for the merger of the Kenya National Human Rights Commission
(KNCHR), the National Gender Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. These are the three commissions
expected to form the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission. The KNCHR and Ombudsman
Bill are awaiting approval by Cabinet while the National Gender Commission Bill is undergoing review and
stakeholder consultations.
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Table 15: Timelines and status of CIC priority Bills44
Bill

Constitutional
(Schedule5)
Deadlines

New
(CIC)
deadlines

1.

2.
3.

Public Service Commission

30 July 2011

Independent Offices

30 May 2011

Auditor-General and Controller
of Budget

03 August 2011

4.
Public Financial Management
5.
6.

26 August 2012

Salaries and Remuneration
Commission
Ethics and Leadership

03 August 2011
15 May 2011

26 August 2012

Ratification of Treaties

21 August 2011

Independent Police Oversight
Authority

18 August 2011

9.
Nations Police Service

26 August 2012

14 September
2011

NSIS

26 August 2012

16 September
2011

National Police Service
Commission

26 August 2012

7 July 2011

National Land Commission

26 March 2012

03 August 2011

10.

11.

12.

Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Before Parliament for
debate
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Awaiting presidential
assent

16 August 2011

7.

8.

Status

Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations
Undergoing internal
review & stakeholder
consultations

Challenges to the implementation of the constitution
122.
Critical Bills on elections are yet to be passed: With just over a year to the next
scheduled elections, the laws to ensure a free, fair and credible election are still not in
place. The lack of a legal and institutional infrastructure to manage elections undermines
confidence in the electoral and democratic processes. It also implies that electoral
management systems will likely not have sufficient time to make the preparations
necessary to secure and assure the integrity of the vote.
123.

A conservative political culture and the old order threaten implementation: The reforms
in the new constitution generally challenge the entrenched power structures, old values
and habits, as well attitudes. But these are so entrenched that it will take time to build a
44 This table outlines additional Bills the CIC considers to be a priority to the implementation of the constitution.
While some are not explicitly provided for under Schedule 5 of the constitution, majority have had their timelines
brought forward with the aim of fast-tracking the implementation process.
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base for new values. Indeed, the recent appointments to the Judiciary, applicants were
questioned on matters of faith, yet the constitution is built on the aspiration to build a
new and open society. It appears as if there are new fears, among some, about the radical
repositioning of the Kenyan society.
124.

The constitution was negotiated; it contains ambiguities that will require further legal
clarification: The constitution contains language ambiguities that may lead Parliament
to debate the meaning of some of the provisions. Already there are several cases in court
seeking judicial interpretation of some of the provisions. Those who opposed the
constitution at the referendum are increasingly using this language ambiguity to force
interpretations that favour them. Further, even those who supported the document do
not agree about the interpretation of some of the provisions. This will remain a challenge
throughout the constitution implementation process.

125.

Civic education is lacking. Important also is that civic education appears to have stopped
with the referendum. For instance, the survey asked how much people knew about the
new constitution. Only 10 per cent of respondents said they knew ‘a lot’ while 65 per cent
said they knew ‘nothing’. Important, however, is the finding that 65 per cent know ‘just
some of it’.
Figure 10: How much would you say you know about the new constitution?

126.

Popular forums for public education such as the Internet, chief’s baraza, and schools
are not providing civic education on the constitution. The media remain the main source
of knowledge about the new constitution. Up to 82 per cent of respondents identified the
media as their main source of information on the new constitution while only 42 per cent
said they had read the document. Only 6 per cent built their knowledge through civic
education delivery groups such as professional associations and civil society
organisations. The main forums of public education do not give any knowledge on the
constitution: in the survey, schools, chief’s baraza, e-learning were not cited as sources of
information and knowledge about the constitution.
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Table 15: What are the sources of what you know about the constitution?
Media

82%

Friends/Relatives

42%

Personally read the constitution

48%

Politicians/Political parties

11%

Religious leaders

9%

Employer

0%

Professional associations

2%

NGOs workshops/forums

4%

Internet

0%

Taught in School by Teachers

0%

Chiefs in barazas

0%

Civic education

0%

Government offices

0%

NR/RTA DK

2%

127.

Many people are not aware about elective posts under the new constitution. Besides the
seats of the President and Member of Parliament (MP), only 11 per cent of Kenyans are
aware that they will be required to vote for women representatives in the next General
Election. Just 16 per cent of the respondents know that they will to vote for youth
representatives.

128.

Lack of cohesion in both Parliament and within the Coalition Government is slowing
the pace of constitution implementation. The discussion above cited lack of cohesion in
government as delaying decision-making and implementation of reforms in general. This
applies to implementation of the constitution as well. The new constitution has
restructured the state and its institutions. It therefore faces the challenge of resistance
from those who support the status quo as well as the old political culture. Divisions along
party lines within Parliament’s departmental committee on Justice, Legal Affairs and
Administration of Justice considerably slowed the process of making judicial
appointments.45

129.

The disagreements within the Coalition Government are also reflected in what people
perceive to be major threats to implementing the constitution. In the June 2011 survey,
40 per cent of the respondents cited political wrangles between coalition partners as the
greatest challenge to the implementation of the constitution. Another 21 per cent said
self-interest among political leaders was an impediment to the implementation process
while 13 per cent felt that delays in Parliament were hindering the implementation of the
constitution.

45

Daily Nation, ‘MPs Reject Namwamba as ODM quits’, Friday, 6 May 2011. Pg72
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Figure 11: What ONE difficulty, if any, do you see facing the implementation of the
constitution?

130.

The implementation challenges are undermining public confidence in the constitution.
Up to 47 per cent of respondents said they are not satisfied with the progress of
implementation. This is a significantly high level of dissatisfaction and could be the result
of disillusionment with the growing tendency by some leaders to undermine the
provisions of the new constitution. There are several public litigation cases in court
seeking to prevent this tendency.
Tabl16: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with progress in implementing the new
constitution?
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Very satisfied

5%

Satisfied

35%

Not satisfied

33%

Not satisfied at all

14%

DK

11%

NR

1%

The media are viewed as having increased people’s knowledge on several other issues. Up
to 85 per cent of the respondents said that media coverage had increased their knowledge
of the ICC. Another 85 per cent and 81 per cent said media coverage has improved their
knowledge of provisions of the constitution and the problem of IDPs, respectively.
Table 17: Has media coverage increased your knowledge of the following issues?

132.

Yes

No

DK

NR

How the ICC operates

85%

13%

1%

1%

Provisions of the new constitution

81%

16%

2%

1%

The problem of IDPs in Kenya

84%

13%

2%

1%

People have also noticed changes after the adoption of the new constitution. Of those
surveyed, 42 per cent said that there is transparent recruitment and vetting of
government officials, while 15 per cent said there is reduced harassment by police.
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Figure 12: What change have you observed in the county since the adoption of the new
constitution?

Judicial reforms
133.
In adherence to the constitution, the Judicial Service Commission has interviewed and
recommended to Parliament candidates for judicial appointments. The interviews were
conducted in public. This is a clear break with the past. It is a radical opening of the
doors to the Judiciary.46 The extent of public participation in the process has improved
public confidence in judicial reforms, which have not been fully implemented, even
though KNDR prioritised them.

46

Interview with an official of KHRC, June 2011
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Figure 13: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the government in addressing judicial
reforms?

60%
53%

50%

40%
32%

30%

20%
14%

10%

0%
Dissatisfied

Satisfied

DK/RTA

134.

A new Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Director for Public Prosecutions have been
appointed. The three were sworn in on 16 June 2011, setting the stage for reforms in the
country’s justice system.47 Some of the priority areas for both the Chief Justice and
Deputy Chief Justice will include vetting of serving judicial officers, improving public
access to justice and clearing the case backlog in the superior and subordinate courts.48

135.

The Supreme Court Bill has been passed into law. The Act is intended to provide the legal
and institutional framework for offsetting up the Supreme Court. The court, once
established, will hear presidential election disputes and interpret the constitution when
called upon to do so.49 This is an important step towards improving service delivery
within the judiciary. It also serves as a final stop where citizens will be able to seek
redress on sensitive national issues, including on disputed presidential elections.

Land reforms
136.
The Ministry of Lands and stakeholders have developed the National Land Commission
Bill and the Harmonised Draft Eviction and Resettlement Guidelines.50 The National
Land Commission Bill is intended to provide for the establishment and development of
institutional and administrative frameworks for the management of land in Kenya. If
passed, the Bill will establish the National Land Commission to co-ordinate and oversee
47 Gazette Notice No. 6653, 6654 and 6655. Dated 16 June 2011. See also
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/index.php?id=771
48 Interview with an official of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)- Kenya Chapter- May 2011
49 Supreme Court Act, 2011.
50 Meeting of Reform Agenda Partners Roundtable held on 12-13 May 2011. See also the National Land
Commission Bill, 2011

35

land reforms in Kenya. The Harmonized Draft Eviction and Resettlement Guidelines are
intended to prevent undignified evictions and afford the country equitable resettlement
policies.51
137.

There are concerns, however, that public involvement in the land reforms process has not
been satisfactory. Some argue that the ministry is yet to fully open the process of
developing the various laws to the public. There are also concerns that other ministries
drafting legislation relevant to land issues are not consulting with the stakeholders and
the Ministry of Lands. There are, therefore, several initiatives in different places that are
not effectively coordinated -- ministries and government departments are not effectively
coordinated in drafting legislation under the new constitution.

Poverty, inequality and regional imbalances
138.
Chapter Eleven of the constitution establishes devolved governments. The Ministry of
Local Government has established a Task Force on Devolved Government to advise on
policy in this regard.52 The Task Force has consulted extensively and provided proposals
on, among other things, the restructuring of the Provincial Administration,
Operationalisation of the county governments and the financial management system of
the counties. The report has also identified various legislative, policy and administrative
frameworks that need to be put in place for the effective and efficient establishment of
county governments.53 Three Bills on the implementation of devolved governments are
currently undergoing stakeholder review. These include the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission Bill, 2011, the Vetting of Public Appointments by Parliament
Bill, 2011, the Political Parties Bill, 2011 and the Elections Bill, 2011. If enacted, these
Bills shall provide the institutional and legislative frameworks for county governments in
Kenya.54
139.

Despite the above, various challenges can be anticipated in the establishment of county
governments. Devolution of power and resources across the country will challenge the
existing political and social structures. Resistance to the process of devolution is
expected.55 Consequently, there will be confusion around the lines of authority and
accountability; it is possible that in the initial phase, there will be resistance by
entrenched groups at the centre as well as outright refusal to delegate administrative
responsibilities because devolution will be undermine such interests. Devolution itself
will test the commitment to reform on the part of the government.

Youth unemployment
140.
Previous reports have outlined the various initiatives set up to tackle unemployment
among the youth. These include the Kazi kwa Vijana (KKV) and the Youth Enterprise
Development Fund. These initiatives have, however, had a limited impact in tackling
youth unemployment in the country. KKV, in particular, remains untenable in the long
term.56 Up to 28 per cent of survey respondents would like the government to
build/revive industries in order to create more jobs for the youth. Up to 22 per cent of
respondents feel that the government should allocate more funds to youth projects while
14 per cent think that the government should give equal opportunity for jobs in each
51

Ibid. See also http://www.lands.go.ke
Interim Report of the Task Force on Devolved Government. A report on the Implementation of Devolved
Government in Kenya, 20 April 2011.
53 Ibid
54 http://cickenya.org/bill_tracker
55 Interview with a member of the Task Force on Devolved Government, June 2011
56 Interview with official from the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. See also The Standard, ‘Tuju calls for
youth jobs to counter chaos’, Wednesday, 22 June 2011.
52
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region.
Figure 14: What can the government do to create more jobs for the youth?

Electoral reforms
141.

The new constitution has overhauled the electoral system, providing for a new
electoral body – the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).
Parliament has passed the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act,
which sets up the new electoral body. It has adopted report of the Interim
Independent Boundaries Review Commission, which gave guidelines on how to
delineate the new constituency boundaries. A new Commission, however, is not in
place. Further, there is some lack of clarity on the date of the next general election: the
constitution provides for elections to be held second Tuesday in August in every fifth
year but there are those who argue that the term of the current parliament will end in
December 2012.

142.

The Elections Bill (2011) has been drafted but awaits conclusion of the work of the
national taskforce on devolution, so that the CIC can incorporate the proposals for
County Governments in the Bill.57 The Bill provides for stiff penalties for electoral
officials who subvert a free and fair election. It insulates the commission from political
manipulation by specifying timeliness, for which Parliament is required to dispense
with the final boundary report, failure to which the commission can by-pass it and
forward its report for publication.

143.

Most Kenyans think using electronic voting and having a powerful independent body
will ensure free and fair elections. Kenyans want a Commission that will enhance

57

“Elections Bill put on hold,” Daily Nation 14 June 2011
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compliance with the law in order to have a clean election. They want improved
security and a stop to voter bribery.
Figure 15: What can be done to have free and fair elections?

What can be done to have free and fair elections?

12%

Improve security during elections

8%

Enforce electoral laws

11%

Enhance civic education before election

21%

Have a powerful and independent electoral body
15%

Stop voter bribery

23%

Use electronic voting system

0%

144.

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Provision of civic education and voter education appears lacking. The next election will
comprise several layers of elective posts but not many respondents are aware about these
posts; many are able to identify only the post of the governor and senator. They are not
aware, for example, about the women representatives. When asked which other seats
apart from the President and MP they will be required to vote in the next general
election, 29 per cent of the respondents were not aware of them. 41 per cent are not
aware about the post senator and governor. Interestingly, close to 90 per cent are not
aware about the post of women representative. . Importantly,29 per cent were not aware
of any.

38

Figure 16: Apart from the President and MP, what other seats do you know you will be
required to vote for in the next elections?
A part from the President and M P, what other seats do you know you
will be required to vote for in the next general elections?
Don't know

29 %

5%

Councillor

14 %

Youth re pre se ntatiives

1 1%

W omen re prese ntatives

Governor

60%

Se nator

59 %

0%
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1 0%

20 %

30 %

4 0%

5 0%

60 %

The passage of the IEBC Bill marks a new chapter in the management of elections in the
country. It is hoped that when the new body is set up, political horse-trading and ethnic
considerations will not take precedence over the national values. It is important for the
IEBC to be unencumbered by any perceptions of bias. The trust of most Kenyans in
having free and fair elections rests with the formation of a new powerful electoral body.
National cohesion and unity

146.

The KNDR agreement required the Coalition Government to foster national unity and
reconciliation through high level meetings in areas affected by the violence. Three years
on, data shows that communities in those areas have undertaken peace initiatives with
support from faith-based and community organisations and humanitarian organisations.
These initiatives, such as ‘connector projects’ by the Catholic Church and the shelter
reconstruction one, have contributed to rebuilding trust among communities.

147.

However, national level politics disrupt these efforts. Political statements and
insinuations that reinforce ethnic division and mistrust undermine peace in regions that
have previously experienced violence. Perceptions of discrimination or bias in the IDP
resettlement programme and the fight against impunity through the International
Criminal Court have undermined the progress made to reconcile communities. The
continued presence of IDPs in camps, despite the nuances around this issue,58 is an
indicator of the failure of reconciliation among communities.

148.

The government also established a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission to
investigate past human rights abuses and recommend measures to guarantee that such
violations do not recur in future. The TJRC is mandated to establish a record, among
others, of all past historical human rights abuses, their cause, nature and extent as well
58

Concerns have been raised that the IDPs in camps are land-hungry individuals seeking to benefit from land
allocation programmes rather than genuinely displaced persons unable to leave camps due to security reasons
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7 0%

as recommend prosecution for perpetrators of gross human rights violations. The TJRC
Act required the commission to promote peace, justice, national unity, healing and
reconciliation among the people of Kenya.
149.

Since its inception, however, the TJRC has suffered several challenges. As previously
reported, civil society raised concern about the credibility of the commission’s
chairperson . Public debate ensued and the Chief Justice was petitioned to set up a
tribunal to investigate these allegations and rule on the suitability of the chair to head the
TJRC. The chair stepped down in November 2010 after a tribunal was set up to
investigate these allegations. However, Court cases challenging the mandate of the
tribunal have prevented the tribunal from working.59

150.

Nevertheless, the TJRC began its work, engaging 304 statement takers across the
country, with 16 out of these being deployed to the prisons across the country where they
conducted interviews, ultimately collecting close to 30,000 statements during the official
window that closed in January 2011.60 In April 2011, it began public hearings in North
Eastern Province where it concentrated on investigating the Wagalla massacre. Later, it
held hearings in Western Province. The TJRC has asked for an extension of its mandate
by six months after the expiry of its term in September 2011 to enable it reasonably
complete its sittings and present its initial report.

151.

Despite these challenges, most respondents said they were confident that the TJRC will
reveal the truth about past violations, promote peace and reconciliation among Kenyans
and investigate past abuses of office by public officials.
Figure 17: How confident are you that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission will
...?

How confident are you that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission will...?
Confident

Not confident

Fullfil its mandate by end of the year
Provide justice for victims
Investigate past abuses of office by public officials
Promote peace and reconciliation among Kenyans
Reveal the truth about past violations of human rights

DK

10%

57%

32%
49%
54%
59%
53%

47%
42%
38%
44%

4%
4%
3%
3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
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However, the data shows that 32 per cent of the respondents are not confident the TJRC
59 Pamela

Chepkemei, ‘Kiplagat Gets Reprieve in Fight Against Tribunal’, The Star, 28 April 2011
http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php/press-a-media/press-releases/244-qaa-press-conference-friday-13thmay-2011
60
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will fulfil its mandate by the end of the year. This could be due to several factors, main
among them contestations over the suitability of its chairman, which delayed its work.
Some vacant commission seats have not been filled, leaving the commission
shorthanded. These and other factors have slowed the commission’s momentum and
negatively impacted on its ability to fulfill its mandate.
153.

The commission’s term expires in September this year, well before it covers a siginificant
portion of its work. Ultimately, the TJRC might have to forego some regions as well as
thematic hearings touching on areas such as torture, massacres, land security and
internally displaced persons (IDPs). These are important regions for the the TJRC work.
A report without insights from all areas of the country may not be received well by those
from the regions where the TJRC did not cover.

154.

National unity and reconciliation can be achieved only through governance reforms,
notably the fight against tribalism and corruption. The concerns expressed by local
communities in the Rift Valley underline their perception that corruption and tribalism
has permeated the reconstruction effort, hence the failure to achieve the desired
outcomes. For instance, the perception among residents of Burnt Forest that IDPs have
unduly benefitted from the shelter reconstruction programme has stirred deep
resentment and eroded the gains made in promoting reconciliation.
Transparency, accountability and impunity

155.

The KNDR required the government to promote transparency and accountability in
public institutions and to fight impunity for corruption. Over the past three years, public
satisfaction with the government’s achievement of these objectives has been, at best,
average. This was informed by the perceived inability or unwillingness by the Kenya
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) to investigate high level corruption crimes. In this
quarter, majority of respondents interviewed said the government had not made much
progress in fighting corruption and tribalism:
Figure 18: Has the country made progress in fighting tribalism/corruption?

Has the country made progress in ...?
The fight
against
tribalism

55%

No

45%

Yes
The fight
against
corruption
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51%
49%

Up to 49 per cent and 45 per cent of respondents think Kenya is making progress in the
fight against tribalism and corruption, respectively. This reflects increasing confidence in
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), which has summoned and questioned
government officials over corruption allegations.61 However, 51 per cent of respondents
think Kenya has not won the war on corruption mainly due to lack of human capacity to
61

At least 22 such cases have been filed against state officials in 2011
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deal with all reported cases, as KACC has only three offices across the country. In
addition, lack of political support to investigate high profile criminal and civil suits is the
biggest challenge to the fight against corruption. Indeed, majority of the respondents are
of the view that politicians are responsible for the failure to fight against corruption:
Figure 19: Who is responsible for the failure to fight against corruption?

Who is responsible for the failure to fight against
corruption?
Don't know

4%
19%

The two Principals(Kibaki/Raila)
Politicians

50%
15%

Kenya Anti Corruption Commission(KACC)
Judiciary

11%

Conclusions
157.
The constitution provides a sound basis for a new Kenya. It anchors, firmly, all the
Agenda 4 reforms. It comprises provisions that, if effectively implemented, will close the
faults on which the post-2007 election violence was built. Unfortunately, its
implementation has begun to show the patterns of behaviour reminiscent of the
business-as-usual culture. Not everyone is recognising that the new constitution implies
a break with the past.
158.

Political challenges continue to hinder comprehensive implementation of the
constitution. This, coupled with inadequate civic education, has reduced public
confidence in the implementation process. Intensifying civic education and building
capacity for public vigilance is an important undertaking if implementation is to remain
on track.
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6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
159.

This report covers the period between April and June 2011. The discussion has focussed
on the key themes under the KNDR agreement, the progress and challenges facing
implementation of the new constitution. Several conclusions have already been made in
several sections of the report. The aim of this section is to summarise the key findings
and conclusions.

160.

The report has emphasised that the Agenda 4 reforms under the KNDR agreement were
aimed at securing sustainable peace by addressing all the fault lines from which the postelection violence evolved. The discussion has also noted that the new constitution
anchors all the Agenda 4 reforms. The spirit of constitutionalism – based on values and
principles espoused by the new constitution – is required to move the country forward.
The new constitution is not an end in it itself; it is a means to achieving the goal of
‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya’.

161.

The report has noted that the socio-political and economic situation did improve after
the signing of the National Accord and has been getting better since then. By the end of
2010, many survey respondents stated that life was better compared to 2008 and that
they felt safer. By June 2010, however, people cited the increasing cost of living and
inflation in general as the main challenges facing the country. Only half of the
respondents feel safer and many are feeling that life is getting worse compared to what it
was one year ago. The declining socio-economic situation requires urgent action because
its negative social consequences could exacerbate political difficulties or even converge
with other dynamics and destabilise the framework for reforms and the society in
general.

162.

The ICC intervention in the Kenyan situation is causing political anxieties. It has
occasioned formation and fragmentation of ethnic coalitions. In this sense, the ICC has
become the driver for the 2012 succession politics and is increasingly becoming another
fault line in Kenyan politics. Nonetheless, many Kenyans still believe that prosecution of
perpetrators of violence will prevent a recurrence of violence. They are disillusioned by
lack of progress in arresting lower and middle level perpetrators or holding senior and
influential people to account. This lack of progress and absence of political will is now
generating disillusionment.

163.

Another General Election is fast approaching even as progress in implementing
institutional reforms in the police and the public service has been slow. Communities
have not fully reconciled and IDPs are in camps. Political leaders are forming ‘ethnic
coalitions’ rather than institutionalising political parties in readiness for the next
election. Nonetheless, the new constitution also spells out the reform measures to be
undertaken to improve the police. Change of attitude and behaviour, and adherence to
modern democratic norms is an imperative for the police as the country moves towards
another election. Thus, vetting of the police must be opened to the public in line with the
standards set under the new constitution. This will improve public confidence in the
police and begin creating a culture of transparency in the force.

164.

The promulgation of the constitution in August 2010 marked a new beginning for Kenya.
The country had a tortuous and protracted two-decade struggle for comprehensive
constitutional reforms. The new constitution is an important milestone in Kenya’s
history. The lack of reforms and socio-political divisions that resulted from poor
governance culminated in the post-2007 election violence. The new constitution clearly
marks a new beginning and a transition from the older order to the new. There is
progress in making some of the laws prioritised under Schedule 5 of the constitution.
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However, there are many laws to finalised by 27 August 2011, the deadline imposed by
the constitution. Parliament will have to increase pace to meet this deadline. Divisions in
Parliament along party and other interests, however, will have to be resolved for it to
effectively meet this challenge.
165.

There is progress in reforming the Judiciary. The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief
Justice are in office through a public participation process. Nominees for other Judges of
the Supreme Court were also recruited through a transparent process; a new standard
entrenched by the constitution. There is also increased vigilance over recruitment
processes for public offices. Public litigation efforts have increased in this respect.
However, this new way of doing things is facing new challenges. The old order is fighting
back.

166.

A conservative political culture and the old order threaten the implementation of the
constitution. Lack of bi-partisan leadership, internal conflicts in the coalition and the
Parliament are slowing the pace of constitution implementation. Further, civic education
providers have not been active, yet awareness on the new constitution is critical for
building citizens’ knowledge to create demand for reforms. However, the public is
supportive of the new achievements, such as the public participation in the appointment
of key state officers.

167.

The findings show that the constitution is one major achievement thus far. It is opening a
new window for reforms and providing space for a fresh start. It has set new standards in
the appointment of public officers. But there has been limited progress in some areas
such as the police, national cohesion and reconciliation, and the fight against impunity in
general. As the country approaches the next General Election, there is need to fast-track
police reforms and the enactment of electoral laws in order to make adequate
preparations for a clean and peaceful election. Importantly, the date for the next general
election must be clarified soonest possible in order to prepare everyone and put the
logistical measures in place early enough.
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